RAPID FIRE - Silver Bullets

Radio Interview with Laura Knoy:
http://www.nhpr.org/node/5339

I think General Eisenhower was exactly right. I think we should be concerned about the military industrial complex. I think if you look at where the country is today, you've consolidated all these defense firms into a few large firms, like Halliburton, with contacts and contracts at the highest level of government. You've got most of the retired Generals, are one way or another, associated with the defense firms. That's the reason that you'll find very few of them speaking out in any public way. I'm not. When I got out I determined I wasn't going to sell arms, I was going to do as little as possible with the Defense Department, because I just figured it was time to make a new start.

But I think that the military industrial complex does wield a lot of influence. I'd like to see us create a different complex, and I'm going to be talking about foreign policy in a major speech tomorrow, but we need to create an agency that is not about waging war, but about creating the conditions for Peace around the world. We need some people who will be advocates for Peace, advocates for economic development not just advocates for better weapons systems. So we need to create countervailing power to the military industrial complex.

Clark: Don't spare Pentagon
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/25/elec04.prez.debate/
"We're faced with a very serious deficit problem. We need to keep the--we need to go back to the top 2 percent and repeal those tax cuts. We need to put all the government spending programs on the table, including the military programs. We need to then have no new programs unless you can pay as you go. And then we need a simpler, fairer, more progressive tax code. "

The Unappreciated General International Herald Tribune The General Who Did Too Good a Job By Patrick B. Pexton Tuesday, May 2, 2000; Page A23 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A51403-2000May1 He ordered 50 Apache attack helicopters to take the battle to the Serb ground troops, only to see the force reduced in size and then left to sit in Albania while the White House and Pentagon fretted about casualties. Clark also was right about readying troops for an invasion. The preparations for a ground war helped persuade Milosevic to surrender.

Elizabeth Drew
New York Book Review

Clark displeased the defense secretary, Bill Cohen, and General Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by arguing strenuously that—contrary to Clinton's decision— the option of using ground troops in Kosovo should remain open. But the problem seems to have gone further back. Some top military leaders objected to the idea of the US military fighting a war for humanitarian reasons. (Clark had also favored military action against the genocide in Rwanda.)

Clark's view on Kosovo, shared by Tony Blair and other European leaders, was that Clinton, by stating that ground troops would not be used there —a position Clinton took for domestic political reasons—gave the Serbs a military advantage. Similarly, Clark wasn't allowed to use helicopter gunships for fear that they might be shot down, despite the fact that the helicopters didn't need to fly over Kosovo itself and the helicopters' missiles could have been more precise in hitting targets than bombers flying at 15,000 feet.

The argument over whether there should be even contingency planning for the use of NATO ground troops in Kosovo (at the time, it appeared that they would have to fight their way in) caused a serious clash between Clinton and Blair, particularly when they met in April 1999 at the White House residence on the eve of a NATO summit.

A close Clinton associate has told me that "to this day" Clinton regrets that he removed the option of ground troops.

Clark's conduct of the Kosovo war, and his earlier participation as the US military negotiator in the meetings in Dayton following the war in Bosnia, earned him the admiration of several of the civilians he had worked with. Strobe Talbott, then the deputy secretary of state, reminded me recently that Clark is, after all, the only Supreme Allied Commander of NATO who actually had to fight a war, "and it ended in victory." Talbott told me that he found Clark to be "extraordinarily determined and able, and open to working with diplomats and civilians, US and foreign." Talbott pointed out that Clark, in commanding the Kosovo war, had had to deal daily with nineteen nations.

Berger, who has not endorsed any of the presidential candidates, also speaks highly of Clark. Richard Holbrooke, under whom Clark served at the Dayton negotiations, is a friend of Clark's and supports his candidacy. Michael Gordon, the Times's able military reporter, who covered the Kosovo war, wrote of Clark in early October that "while NATO's military campaign was not perfect by any means...the general's judgment of... critical issues seems pretty solid when viewed in perspective; a humanitarian wrong was righted and NATO won its first and only war."
—October 22, 2003